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RITI

COMMENT
Three Sheets to the Wind:
The Renewable Energy Production Tax Credit,
Congressional Political Posturing, and an
Unsustainable Energy Policy
*

CHRISTOPHER RITI

INTRODUCTION
A.

The Global Backdrop

America, together with the larger global community, is facing
an unprecedented energy crisis.1 The United States (U.S.) is
undeniably addicted to inefficient, environmentally deleterious
energy sources like coal and petroleum. This slavish addiction is
characterized not only by a self-destructive relationship with the
natural environment but by its palpable threat to national
security and economic vitality. While the U.S. comprises only a
small percentage of the world’s population (4.6%), the country
*

Christopher Riti is the Graduate Research Fellow for the Center for
Environmental Legal Studies at Pace University School of Law. He is currently
pursuing an LL.M. degree in climate change law from Pace, having received his
B.A. from Yale University and J.D. from Pace, specializing in energy and
climate change law. He served for three years as a Research Associate with the
Pace Energy and Climate Center, and as a delegate energy advisor to the
Permanent Mission of Grenada at the U.N.
1. International Energy Agency, Energy Technology Perspectives 2008,
Tokyo Launch (June 6, 2008), available at http://www.iea.org/Textbase/
techno/etp/ETP_2008.pdf (requiring $45 trillion dollars in investments).
Mohamed ElBaradei, Dir. Gen., Int’l Atomic Energy Agency, Address at the
Commonwealth Finance Ministers Meeting 2008: Addressing the Global Energy
Crisis (Oct. 6-8 2008), http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Transcripts/2008/cfm
061008.pdf. See also James Kanter, International Agency Urges the Start of an
‘Energy Revolution’, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2008; Vivienne Walt, Why the Energy
Crisis Will Outlast the Credit Crisis, TIME, Nov. 15, 2008, http://www.time.com/
time/business/article/0,8599,1859236,00.html.
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consumes more than one quarter of all global petroleum
products.2 To sate this considerable appetite, the U.S. must
import over 60% of its oil from international sources, over and
above whatever is produced domestically.3 The result is a country
left unsettlingly vulnerable to political posturing, price volatility,
and technological instability.4 Further, these imports contribute
substantially to America’s ballooning trade deficit, devaluing the
dollar in a frighteningly stagnant economy.5 Multinational fossil
fuel companies with clearly vested interests—working together
with broken domestic automakers (firms that until recently have
had no motivation to develop scalable, fuel-efficient vehicles)—are
blatantly compromising the country’s energy future. In addition,
coal—responsible for almost half of the power generated in the
6
U.S. —is one of the more inefficient and polluting fuel sources,
from its destructive extraction to its large-scale burning.7

2. See The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/rankorder/2174rank.html (last visited Aug.. 15, 2010); Energy
Information Administration, U.S. Petroleum Supply, Consumption, and
Inventories (Aug. 2010), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/steo/pub/
4atab.pdf; Energy Information Administration, World Petroleum Consumption
(Aug. 2010), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/steo/pub/3dtab.pdf. Safe,
Strong and Secure: Reducing America’s Oil Dependence, http://www.nrdc.org/
air/transportation/ aoilpolicy2.asp (last visited Aug. 15, 2010).
3. The Select Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming,
http://globalwarming.house.gov/issues/energyindependence?id=0002 (last visited
Aug. 15, 2010) [hereinafter The Select Committee].
4. Safe, Strong and Secure: Reducing America’s Oil Dependence,
http://www.nrdc.org/air/transportation/aoilpolicy2.asp (last visited Aug. 15,
2010); The Select Committee, supra note 3. See also IND. TASK FORCE #58,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, NATIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. OIL
DEPENDENCY (2006), available at http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attach
ments/EnergyTFR.pdf (also notes that “often, [oil] revenues accrue to a small
minority that is unaccountable to any representative political authority, which
not only undermines governance, but also risks the political stability that is
essential to reliable production of oil and gas.”); REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
SECURITY TASK FORCE ON ENERGY, ENERGY SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: A
NEW NATIONAL STRATEGY (2006), available at http://www.americanprogress.
org/kf/ energy_security_report.pdf.
5. See The Select Committee, supra note 3.
6. Electric Power Monthly, EIA.DOE.GOV, http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/
electricity/epm/epm_sum.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2010).
7. NYSERDA, ENERGY ANALYSIS PROGRAM, COAL RESOURCE ASSESSMENT
2006, available at http://www.nyserda.org/sep/sepsection3-7.pdf.
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Besides the obvious strategic disadvantages associated with
enslavement to fossil fuels, the costs to human health and the
environment are enormous. Air pollution—greenhouse gases,
particulates, smog, and toxins—is intrinsic to this process and
represents a discernible threat to populations located not only
within the expansive vicinities of these generating plants, but
across the planet.8 Water pollution, in the form of widespread
contamination of drinking water supplies, directly affects millions
across the nation.9 Mercury, arsenic, and other highly toxic
chemicals natural to coal tailings threaten sensitive waters at
every stage of power processing.10
Many policymakers are cogently beginning to acknowledge
the overwhelming contribution to global climate change by the
burning of fossil fuels.11 Scientific, nonpartisan studies continue
to indicate, in an ever more forceful way, that climatological
changes causing droughts, famines, and altered weather patterns
are closely linked to anthropogenic activity.12 Potent greenhouse
gases—the result of unsustainable methods of power production,
agriculture, development, and transportation—are building up
within the atmosphere at unprecedented rates and pressurecooking the earth by trapping the sun’s rays and radiation.13
These atmospheric greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations have
finally exceeded the Earth’s absorptive capacity, resulting in an
average increase in the surface temperature of the Earth and its
8. NYSERDA, supra note 7; UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME,
ATMOSPHERIC BROWN CLOUDS: REGIONAL ASSESSMENT REPORT WITH FOCUS ON
ASIA (2008), http://www.unep.org/pdf/ABCSummaryFinal.pdf.
9. See, e.g., Water Quality Issues of Electricity Production: Pollution of
Water Bodies, http://www.powerscorecard.org/issue_detail.cfm?issue_id=6 (last
visited Aug. 20, 2010).
10. See, e.g., Environmental Impacts of Coal Power: Air Pollution,
http://www.ucsusa.com/clean_energy/coalvswind/c02c.html (last visited Aug 14,
2010) (noting that “[I]In an average year, a typical coal plant generates . . . 225
pounds of arsenic, which will cause cancer in one out of 100 people who drink
water containing 50 parts per billion”); ScienceDaily, Higher Levels of
Pollutants Found in Fish Caught Near a Coal-fired Power Plant, SCIENCEDAILY,
Nov. 8, 2007, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/11/071107083907.htm;
LARRY THOMAS, COAL GEOLOGY 292-93 (2002).
11. IPCC, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, IN CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE
PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 2-3, 13 (2007).
12. See id.
13. Id.

3

RITI

786

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

oceans over a protracted period of time.14 As the temperature
rises, “changes in precipitation patterns, storm severity, and sea
level”—in addition to widespread ocean acidification and land
desertification—will only continue to worsen, pushing once
diverse ecosystems to the brink of collapse and fundamentally
altering the human community.15
Add to this ecological quandary a crumbling national
infrastructure, a severely recessed economy, and a constantly
burgeoning population marked by a ravenous consumer culture.
As such, the need to develop alternative and renewable sources of
energy has never been more pressing or explicit. Technological
capabilities are hardly the limiting factor in this equation.
Indeed, solar panels, wind turbines, geothermal piping, and fuel
cells are all viable, clean sources of potential fuel that can form a
large part of a comprehensive, sustainable energy solution.16
Rather, the biggest obstacle facing realization of this massive
potential17 concerns the initial capital costs of implementing these
technologies on a large-scale basis—on the levels sufficient to
produce enough clean electricity to offset and eventually replace
that which is produced by conventional internal combustion at
14. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, GREENHOUSE GASES, CLIMATE
CHANGE, AND ENERGY 1 (2008), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/
ggccebro/chapter1.html.
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., U.S. DOE, Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, 20% Wind
Energy by 2030: Increasing Wind Energy’s Contribution to U.S. Electric Supply,
July 2008. See also Mesa Power Places World’s Largest Single-Site Wind
Turbine Purchase Order, ENERGY & ECOLOGY, May 26, 2008 (T. Boone Pickens,
expressing his hope that Congress will enact a long-term extension of the
Production Tax Credit, noted that with there is no decline curve with
renewables, as opposed to traditional fossil fuel sources, where once the well or
mine is exhausted, another site is needed).
17. Clean Energy: From the Margins to the Mainstream: Hearings of the S.
Finance Comm., 109th Cong. (2007) (statement of Ryan Wiser, Scientist,
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory) (opining that while European
countries with “aggressive, longer-term policy commitments” are generating
anywhere from 10-20% of their electricity from wind, the U.S., “despite having a
much more robust resource, currently meets less than 1 percent of its electricity
needs with wind.”). See also U.S. Senator Pete V. Domenici (R-NM) Holds a
Hearing on the Implementation of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, FDCH
POLITICAL TRANSCRIPTS, July 11, 2006 (PTC will enable the “full development of
the 5,600-megawatt capacity that is considered available in the western United
States over the next decade.”).
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power plants.18 These costs can range into the hundreds of
millions of dollars, and have generally been inaccessible to all but
the largest corporate entities with disposable capital.19 Achieving
scalability continues to be the intransigent problem that impedes
investment and widespread implementation.
This lack of
investment is in turn preventing scalability, thus perpetuating a
stalling cycle within the industry. Renewables are unable to gain
a foothold within the national infrastructure, as investors are
hesitant to invest resources in projects that they are not certain
will produce any viable returns over the 10-15 year short-term
future.20 Moreover, the volatility of world oil prices undercuts the
ability of more efficient alternatives to gain a foothold in the
marketplace.21 As long as oil prices are low, at least as compared
to investments in new technologies, there is no incentive to make
power companies realize these clean opportunities for
redevelopment. And with no incentive, there is no action.
B.

Shifting the Balance Through Incentives

For the better part of a quarter century, policymakers and
developers have been working on various incentivizing measures
and mechanisms that will remove the institutional and financial
impediments to clean energy investment.22
The merits or
disadvantages of these technologies will not be addressed here;
rather, this comment will focus on one of the more productive
mechanisms for stimulating and encouraging investment, the
Federal Renewable Energy Production Tax Credit. First
18. See, e.g., Dave Newman, Empowering the Wind: Overcoming Obstacles to
Wind Energy Development in the United States, 3 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y
5 (2003).
19. Denis Hayes, Solar and Wind Power Held Hostage—Again, YALE ENV’T
360, http://e360.yale.edu/content/feature.msp?id=2060.
20. Id.
21. Clifford Krauss, Alternative Energy Suddenly Faces Headwinds, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 20, 2008 at B1 (noting the disincentives for renewables investment
associated with falling oil prices, the author recalls a similar situation in the
1980s, “when a decade of advances for alternative energy collapsed amid falling
prices for conventional fuels.”).
22. See James W. Moeller, Of Credits and Quotas: Federal Tax Incentives for

Renewable Resources, State Renewable Portfolio Standards, and the Evolution
of Proposals for a Federal Renewable Portfolio Standard, 15 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.
REV. 69 (2004).
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instituted in the 1992 Energy Policy Act,23 this Production Tax
Credit (PTC) was introduced to help foster the transition to
renewable energy production by offsetting the much higher costs
of such energy. Theoretically, these tax credits would help to
both subsidize a nascent industry dependent upon government
sponsorship, narrowing the cost gap between renewables and
traditional power generation and working to defray the costs of
initial capital investment by subsidizing the utilities’ levelized
costs.24 For a taxpayer with positive tax liability, the PTC serves
as the functional equivalent of a government subsidy by reducing
the taxpayer’s liabilities for several years through marginal cost
reduction.25 In this way, investors were more willing to commit
on a long-term basis to sustainable wind-farms, solar panels, and
other forms of renewable energy as revenue streams would
remain consistently competitive with traditional fuel sources.26
However, the Production Tax Credit, practically from the
moment of its implementation, has provoked a veritable hornet’s
nest of intense and protracted political controversy. Its long-term
viability has been held hostage by the fickle partisan squabbling
that has plagued Congress since its own inception. Caught
between powerful industries and political disputes, the PTC is
consistently unable to achieve its maximum potential in terms of
spurring growth rates for renewable development. The legislative
23. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (codified in
scatted sections of 11, 15, 16, 25, 26, 30 & 42 U.S.C.).
24. BRANDON OWENS, NATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY LABORATORY, NREL/TP620-31969, AN ECONOMIC VALUATION OF A GEOTHERMAL PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT
2 (2002). See also JOEL DARMSTATDER, RESOURCE FOR THE FUTURE, THE
ECONOMIC AND OF RENEWABLE ENERGY 4-5 (2003)
At its core, the decision of how to expand electricity-generating capacity
rests on the comparative marginal costs of renewable versus
conventional systems . . . [E]ven apart from future trends in fuel costs, it
stands to reason that technological improvements in power production
will apply not just to renewables but to their nonrenewable competitors
as well, thus hampering renewables’ success in gaining market share.

Id. “Levelized cost” is the marginal cost of electricity production over the life of
the facility, including all capital expenditures, equity and fuel costs, and
operating costs.
25. JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING
TO TAX CREDITS FOR ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION FROM RENEWABLE SOURCES 8-12
(2005).
26. See, e.g., id. at iii.
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failure to extend the PTC has come at a terrible price—failure to
initiate strong wind and solar development has lead to continued
environmental degradation and a sagging economic and national
infrastructure, one that is dependent upon an outdated and
ultimately unreliable form of power generation. Moreover, the
uncertainty of the provision from year to year has created a
“boom-and-bust” cycle of investment.27 Until the PTC—or a
useful equivalent—can be formally extended for more than a
limited period, it will continue to fall short of incentivizing
renewable development at an environmentally and economically
acceptable rate. With an administration seemingly dedicated to
energy infrastructure redevelopment, clean energy alternatives,
and a strong understanding of the fundamentals of economic
stimulation, there is hope yet that the PTC will come to achieve
its stated goal.28
C.

Overview

This comment purports to examine the troubled history of
the Production Tax Credit, in the hopes of isolating some of the
more contentious reasons for its stunted progress and suggesting
ways by which Congress might arrive at a more lasting
compromise. Moreover, there are distinct policy options available
to the current presidential administration—through a
combination of carbon cap legislation, an Infrastructure Bank,
and the repeal of fossil fuel subsidies—that can deliver upon the
unrealized promise of renewable energy. This analysis will segue
into a broad review of the Energy Security and Independence Act
of 2007, which marked an unsuccessful bid to extend the PTC for
several more years. This review will serve as an illuminating
microcosm of the larger partisan battle at the center of which lies
27. See, e.g., RYAN WISER, MARK BOLINGER & GALEN BARBOSE, USING THE
FEDERAL PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT TO BUILD A DURABLE MARKET FOR WIND POWER
IN THE UNITED STATES (2007); Mona Hymel, The United States’ Experience with

Energy-Based Tax Incentives: The Evidence Supporting Tax Incentives for
Renewable Energy, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 43 (2006); VICKI ARROYO, GLOBAL
WARMING: CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE LAW (2007).
28. Kate Galbraith, Obama Vows Support for Renewables—and a Carbon
Cap, Green A Blog About Energy & the Environment, N.Y. TIMES,
http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/25/obama-vows-support-for-renewablesand-a-carbon-cap/ (Feb. 25, 2009, 6:57 AM)
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the politically threatening PTC. Finally, this paper will survey
more recent legislation—specifically with regard to the financial
bailout and stimulus packages—to see exactly where the PTC’s
future prospects are hidden. The paper will culminate with policy
recommendations that might serve as a rudimentary framework
for future negotiations between the relevant parties. Ultimately,
the fight over the PTC is but a fringe skirmish in a much larger
war over the systemic viability of our government and our
natural world. The unsustainable path that we have beaten since
the Industrial Revolution offers only a bleak, strained future
bereft of biodiversity. It is the hope of this author that by
drawing attention to this critical legislation and its implications,
that future may be altered.
I.

HISTORY OF THE PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT

A.

Inception: The Energy Policy Act of 1992

In an effort to spur consistent renewable energy
infrastructure development and generation, Congress created the
Renewable Energy Production Tax Credit within the Energy
Policy Act of 1992.29 The Act provided for an inflation-adjusted
1.5 cent per kilowatt hour (kWh) tax credit for electricity
produced from wind and closed-loop biomass resources and sold to
an unrelated third party during the taxable year in question.30
Qualifying energy developments were eligible to receive the tax
credit for 10 years following startup. Almost immediately, this
tax credit had a profound impact on stimulating economic growth
and heavy investment in renewable energy technology and
installation.31 The credit has since been expanded to include
municipal solid waste, qualified hydropower, biomass, and

29. Energy Policy Act of 1992 § 1914(a), 106 Stat. 2776, 3020 (codified at 26
U.S.C. § 45(c) (1992)).
30. Id.
31. See Green Job Growth and Global Warming: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Env’t and Pub. Works, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Bill Unger,
Partner Emeritus, Mayfield Fund); Emily Kennedy, Federal Regulations,
Incentives, and Funding of Renewable Energy in 2006, 1 ENVT’L & ENERGY L. &
POL’Y J. 403 (2007); Newman, supra note 18, at 5 ; Moeller, supra note 22, at 69.
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geothermal facilities, among others.32 The PTC was codified in
Section 45 of the Internal Revenue Code.33
The PTC has been extended at various points in subsequent
years; however, inconsistent extension has led to a staggered
investment pattern that has impaired the ability of the renewable
energy industry to effectively entrench itself within the larger
national energy infrastructure.34
One of the more recent
iterations of the PTC has been the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EP
Act), which codified an extension through the year 2008.35 This
congressional decision met with strong opposition mainly from
interest-backed Republican congressmen who took issue almost
exclusively with the proposed form of offsetting funds for the
credits themselves, i.e. the proposed repeal of oil and natural gas
subsidies.36
B.

Transition: Energy Policy Act of 2005 and Other
Federal Considerations

While the 2005 EP Act did extend the PTC, it also provided
for a handout of billions of dollars in subsidies for the fully
matured and exorbitantly wealthy oil and natural gas
industries.37 This was presumably to equalize the government
treatment of the fossil fuel-based and renewable energy
industries. However, these subsidies, whatever their superficial
justification, are effectively sweetheart deals meant to pacify a
recalcitrant industry sector bent on frustrating widespread
renewable and alternative energy institutionalization.
The
reasons are obvious—renewable energy generation, which is
clean, consistent, and idealistically cost-effective, is a direct
threat to the oil and natural gas industries’ future viability. In
32. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. 111-5, 111th
Cong. (2009). The credit, as of the date of this article, currently stands at about
2.1 cents per kilowatt hour generated.
33. I.R.C. § 45 (2006); see Form 8835, Renewable Electricity, Refined Coal,
and Indian Coal Production Credit, 2008.
34. Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999 § 507, Pub.
L. 106-170 (2006); Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act § 603, Pub. L. 107147 (2006); The Working Families Tax Relief Act § 313, Pub. L. 108-311 (2006).
35. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005).
36. See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. 80, at 6676-77.
37. Energy Policy Act of 2005, §§ 342-43.
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effect, every kilowatt of clean energy generated by a renewable
project and subsidized by the federal government is construed as
an affront to fossil fuels in general. To counteract this perceived
favoritism, congressional leaders felt it was better to assuage the
oil and natural gas sectors with billion-dollar handouts than to
work with the industries to create an equitable policy standard—
one that would protect their present interests while not
sacrificing future stability of human health and the environment.
At any rate, these subsidies have continued to upset the balance
of progress in favor of renewable investment by handcuffing
future Congresses and weakening their ability to extend the PTC,
and have led to further environmental ruin.38 The PTC was again
extended in the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006.39
Congress has also frequently contemplated other
mechanisms or policies that would work in conjunction with the
Production Tax Credit to incentivize renewable energy
generation. One of the most direct ways in which to do this would
be to enact a Federal Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS).40 An
RPS would effectuate a federal mandate to energy utilities to
purchase a specified amount of their electricity from renewable
generators.41 Combined with a PTC that defrays not only
operating but initial capital costs, the federal RPS would create
and guarantee a vibrant market for renewable energy.42

38. See, e.g., Roberta Mann, Symposium: The Business of Climate Change:
Challenges and Opportunities for Multinational Business Enterprises: Another
Day Older and Deeper in Debt: How Tax Incentives Encourage Burning Coal
and the Consequences for Global Warming, 20 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. &
DEV. L. J. 111 (2007).
39. Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, § 201, Pub. L. 109-432
40. Barry Rabe, In this Issue: Sustainable Energy: Race to the Top: The
Expanding Role of U.S. State Renewable Portfolio Standards, 7 SUSTAINABLE
DEV. L. & POL’Y 10 (2007); Joel B. Eisen, The Environmental Responsibility of
the Regionalizing Electric Utility Industry, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 295
(2005); Mary Ann Ralls, Congress Got It Right: There’s No Need to Mandate
Renewable Portfolio Standards, 27 ENERGY L. J. 451 (2006).
41. Sen. Bingaman: Encouraging Renewable Energy Investment, U.S. FED.
NEWS, May 5, 2004 (“[a]ccording to an EIA analysis of a 10 percent RPS, it
would quadruple the amount of electricity produced from wind energy”).
42. See generally KAREN PALMER & DALLAS BURTRAW, RESOURCES FOR THE
FUTURE, ELECTRICITY, RENEWABLES, AND CLIMATE CHANGE: SEARCHING FOR A
COST-EFFECTIVE POLICY (2004).
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Together, investment is made much more attractive, as market
demand begins to outweigh costs associated with the enterprise.43
C.

Stimulation: Effect of the Production Tax Credit

To date, the Production Tax Credit has stimulated renewable
energy investment to unforeseen levels.44 Particularly indicative
of this industry activity is the wind sector, which has posted 36%
(2003), 43% (2005), and 27% (2006) increases in MW capacity
installed in each of the years in which the PTC has been firmly in
place.45 Even in spite of its difficulties, its impact on the
renewable energy industry has been truly encouraging and has
helped to lay the groundwork for a stronger renewable energy
infrastructure.46 Due in part to the effects of the PTC, the U.S.
“led the world in newly installed wind power capacity” for the
years 2005 and 2006, investing nearly $4 billion since 1994.47
Making renewable energy cost competitive is the
quintessential function of the PTC, and thus far it has not failed
in its endeavor. After factoring in inflation-adjusted credits,
wind-generated electricity can cost as little as 6 cents per
kilowatt hour, as compared to the 3 to 5 cents for coal-fired
electricity.48 That price gap is far more palatable when the PTC
is in play. In one study, a ten year enactment of the PTC, at 1.8
cent per kWh (inflation-adjusted), was estimated to reduce the
levelized cost of electricity for geothermal facilities by 25%,
43. Robert J. Michaels, National Renewable Portfolio Standard: Smart Policy
or Misguided Gesture?, 29 ENERGY L. J. 79 (2008); WOOD MACKENZIE, AMERICAN
WIND ENERGY ASSOCIATION, THE IMPACT OF A FEDERAL RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO
STANDARD (2007).
44. See, e.g., John Herrick, Federal Project Financing Incentives for Green
Industries: Renewable Energy and Beyond, 43 NAT. RESOURCES J. 77, 109
(2003).
45. Union of Concerned Scientists, Production Tax Credit for Renewable
Energy,
http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/solutions/big_picture_solutions/
production-tax-credit-for.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2010).
46. Brad Sherman, A Time to Act Anew: A Historical Perspective on the
Energy Policy Act of 2005 and the Changing Electrical Energy Market, 13 WM.
& MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 211 (2006).
47. RYAN WISER, MARK BOLINGER & GALEN BARBOSE, LAWRENCE BERKELEY
NATIONAL LABORATORY, USING THE FEDERAL PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT TO BUILD A
DURABLE MARKET FOR WIND POWER IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (2007).
48. Power Source, CFO MAGAZINE, July 2006.
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enough to bring it within the range of competition with
conventional fossil fuel-based power generation.49 In another
study of only wind and closed-loop biomass development, an
extension of the PTC until 2020 results in renewables accounting
for 11.5% of total electricity generation in the U.S.50 Future
forecasts for wind development vary significantly according to the
source.51
“Unfortunately in this instance, two plus one plus one does
not necessarily equal five predictable years . . . Business thrives
on the known and fails on the unknown. The unpredictable
nature of the credit has prevented the needed investment in
U.S.—based facilities that will drive the economies of scale and
efficiencies.”52 Perhaps the most illuminating indicator of its
importance comes when the credit has actually been unavailable
due to expiration.53 The unpredictability and uncertainty of an
extension before any expiration year has had a profoundly
detrimental effect on widespread investment.54 When investors
cannot be sure of the quality of their investment—in the form of
expected return (which includes savings from tax credits)—
healthy investment will be chilled. This has precisely been the
case, as renewables investment has fallen off precipitously for
each year in which the PTC has expired and has significantly
cooled for those years where its fate was undecided and

49. BRANDON OWENS, NATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY LABORATORY, AN
ECONOMIC VALUATION OF A GEOTHERMAL PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT at iii (2002).
See also Alternative-energy tax credits still up in air, THE NEWS JOURNAL
(WILMINGTON, DELAWARE), June 1, 2008 (discussing how a “tax credit brings
down a developer’s costs by roughly 30 percent”).
50. PALMER & BURTRAW, supra note 42, at 38.
51. See
IEA
World
Energy
Outlook;
RUDOLF
RECHSTEINER,
ENERGYWATCHGROUP, WIND POWER IN CONTEXT: A CLEAN REVOLUTION IN THE
ENERGY SECTOR (2008), available at http://www.energywatchgroup.org/
fileadmin/global/pdf/2009-01_Wind_Power_Report.pdf.
52. Clean Energy: From the Margins to the Mainstream: Hearings of the S.
Finance Comm., 109th Cong. (2007) (statement of Dean Gosselin, V.P. of Bus.
Dev. for Wind Power, FPL Energy).
53. See Utilities Plan on Renewables, Even Without Mandate, INSIDE ENERGY
WITH FEDERAL LANDS, Aug. 15, 2005 (describing the critical importance of
planning horizons for utilities in recouping costs).
54. AARON SEVERN, ET AL., AMERICAN WIND ENERGY ASSOCIATION, WIND
ENERGY PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT (PTC) (2008).
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uncertain.55 For example, in the years the PTC has been allowed
to lapse, investment in wind-based infrastructure has fallen 7393% in the following years.56 This clear trend validates the sense
of urgency surrounding the future of the PTC and the renewable
energy industry itself.
There are numerous other negative consequences associated
with a lapse of the PTC. First, institutional interest in financing
large capital projects begins to dissipate several months before
the lapse, which compounds the already-tenuous state of most
renewable projects.57 Increased generating capacity is the key to
developing successful market penetration.58 Without the PTC
investors are not willing to commit resources to such a risky
project, especially in the present economic climate, when venture
capital is all too elusive.59 The next issue relates to the delayed
extension of the tax credit. According to the American Wind
Energy Association, a “rush to complete projects before the
deadline creates a herd effect. Developers and sponsors dash to
stick pylons in the ground, spiking turbine prices.”60 This “herd
effect” counterproductively works against the intended effect of
the PTC, as it unnecessarily drives up already-high prices. As a
result, investors lose the incentive to devote capital to projects if
they have to pay above-market rates. This messy situation does
not in any way facilitate the PTC’s potential to leverage private
55. See id.
56. AWEA.com, AWEA Legislative Priorities, http://www.awea.org/
legislative/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2010).
57. See Key Challenges Remain for Developing and Deploying Advanced
Energy Technologies to Meet Future Needs, GAO REPORTS, Dec. 20, 2006.
58. Renewable Energy and Clean Air Compliance; Green Convergence, EPA
CLEAN AIR INTERSTATE RULES MANAGEMENT QUARTERLY, June 22, 2005 (“over
time, learning rates and experience will improve the economics of [renewables,
as] the costs of generation decline with increasing cumulative capacity in the
market”).
59. Clean Energy: From the Margins to the Mainstream: Hearings of the S.
Finance Comm., 109th Cong. (2007) (statement of Todd Raba, Pres.,
MidAmerican Energy Company) (speaking about the effect of the PTC lapse on
his wind development, “we couldn’t risk final acquisition and installation of the
turbines without the PTC being restored, as the project would not have met the
cost requirements of the Iowa Utilities Board.” Energy law, as it relates to
utility regulation, often affects decisions closely linked to the PTC).
60. Renewables: Challenges Ahead for the U.S. Wind Industry, MODERN
POWER SYSTEM, Sept. 13, 2005.
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cost funding. Furthermore, allowing the credit to lapse threatens
the economic stability of the ambient investment zones.61 The
credit is closely linked to the economic fortunes of those
communities most in need of stimulation.
D.

Costs of the Production Tax Credit

Since the program’s inception in 1992, the cost of PTC claims
for the federal government have been estimated at more than
$2.7 billion.62 While this figure seems large in an absolute sense,
comparatively it is quite paltry—consider that in 2006 alone, the
government offered fiscal subsidies to the fossil fuel, nuclear, and
ethanol industries at a cost of over $64 billion.63 Any proposals
for its extension inevitably, and appropriately, consider the costs
of such an endeavor. Studies have also shown that “from the
perspective of the U.S. Treasury, it is likely that the net cost of
the PTC would be insignificant or perhaps even negative.”64 This
conclusion is a result of the higher tax liabilities often associated
with renewable energy projects, as compared to an average fossil
fuel-based power plant.65 Furthermore, it is foreseeable that
there will be less and less of a need for the PTC once the
renewable energy industry has successfully established its
foothold in the market. This has been the result of most other
61. See, e.g., Rep. Pomeroy Calls on Administration to Support Wind Energy
Investments, U.S. FED. NEWS, Feb. 13, 2008 (noting that the “last time the
credit expired at the end of 2003 over 2,000 jobs were lost and 1,500 megawatts
of new wind energy production and nearly $2 billion in economic activity were
put on hold” just in North Dakota alone); Mary O’Discoll, Wind Power: Congress
Sends Tax Cut Bill with Renewable Provision to President, GREENWIRE, Sept.
24, 2008 (2,000 MW of suspended new windpower development “translates into
$2 billion in economic activity” and over 2,000 jobs).
62. RYAN WISER, MARK BOLINGER & GALEN BARBOSE, USING THE FEDERAL
PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT TO BUILD A DURABLE MARKET FOR WIND POWER IN THE
UNITED STATES 13 (2007).
63. Id.
64. See generally BRANDON OWENS, NATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY
LABORATORY, AN ECONOMIC VALUATION OF A GEOTHERMAL PRODUCTION TAX
CREDIT (2002).
65. Id. (“In fact, a recent analysis of geothermal federal royalties and income
taxes found that federal taxation on geothermal power is about three to four
times that of electricity produced from a new natural-gas combined-cycle power
plant.”) (citations omitted.).
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government subsidies, where cost curves shift downwards as
technologies achieve economies of scale.66 Contrastingly, some
studies have indicated that the PTC essentially pays for itself, if
not producing a net positive for the Treasury.67
II. ENERGY INDEPENDENCE AND SECURITY ACT
OF 2007, THE ECONOMIC RECESSION, AND
RECENT LEGISLATION
More than ten years after its creation, the Production Tax
Credit had certainly accomplished its main objective of
stimulating new renewable energy development throughout the
country. But its future is precarious at best, especially in light of
recent economic stagnation.
A.

2007: Continuing the Dialogue

The legislative history of the Energy Independence and
Security Act of 2007, contained within the span of a year, is
typically complex and contentious.68 The fact that a workable,
environmentally beneficial piece of legislation was produced is
nothing short of miraculous. However, the noticeable absence of
both a Production Tax Credit extension and a federal Renewable
Portfolio Standard was at once unsurprising and terribly
disheartening to the prospects of continued renewable energy
investment and development.
The House of Representatives proposed the far-reaching
CLEAN Energy Act of 2007, one that included generous

66. Renewable Energy and Clean Air Compliance: Green Convergence, EPA
CLEAN AIR INTERSTATE RULES MANAGEMENT QUARTERLY, June 22, 2005 (finding
that “[t]he Global Energy Decisions study projects that with each new megawatt
of installed wind powered capacity, efficiencies improve and costs decline”).
67. Nathanial Gronewold, Renewable Energy: Industry Execs Urge Congress
to Act on “Overdue” Tax-Credit Extension, E&E NEWS PM, June 18, 2008
(“Although there is an initial cost, the windfall that eventually comes from taxed
income on new jobs, vendor profits and the projects themselves pumped a net
$250 million into the Treasury last year”).
68. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121
Stat. 1492 (to be codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. and 49 U.S.C.)
(2007).
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provisions for both a federal RPS and renewable PTC.69 The
Senate’s own proposal, Senate Amendment 1704,70 would have
extended the PTC, but was ultimately blocked by congressional
Republicans and never made it past the Senate floor.71 Once
again, the billions of dollars in subsidies to oil and natural gas
companies were at the root of the problem. To pay for the PTC,
the bill’s sponsors proposed rolling back or repealing these grossly
excessive subsidies to such well-established industries, and to
share this wealth with much more nascent (and arguably more
critical to the nation’s energy future) industries. Republican
Congressmen—especially those traditionally favorable towards
oil and gas industries—were in complete and unmitigated
opposition to this proposal.72 The majority of those legislators
recast this common sense suggestion as a unilateral attack on the
oil and gas industries, with some arguing that the subsidy repeal
constituted an unjustified penalty or punishment levied unfairly
against the most patriotic of American businesses.73
Understandably, contentious debate ensued and signaled the
early doom of the PTC.
The Senate then introduced its Renewable Fuels, Consumer
Protection, and Energy Efficiency Act of 2007, which generated
similar debate after its decision to keep the PTC provisions
intact.74 The House responded to the aforementioned legislation
with two additional bills, the New Direction for Energy
Independence, National Security, and Consumer Protection Act,75
69. H.R. 6, 110th Cong. (2007). See FRED SISSINE, THE STRATEGIC ENERGY
EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLE RESERVE IN THE CLEAN ENERGY ACT OF 2007 (CRS
Report for Congress) (2007) [hereinafter SISSINE, CLEAN ENERGY ACT]; 153 CONG.
REC. S7680 (daily ed. June 14, 2007) (statements of Rep. Craig, Rep. Bingaman,
& Rep. Domenici); 153 CONG. REC. E151 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 2007) (statement of
Rep. Tiahrt).
70. S.Amdt. 1704 (Energy Tax Provisions) (2007).
71. See FRED SISSINE, OMNIBUS ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLE ENERGY
LEGISLATION: A SIDE-BY-SIDE COMPARISON OF MAJOR PROVISIONS IN HOUSEPASSED H.R. 3221 WITH SENATE-PASSED H.R. 6 (CRS Report for Congress) (2007).
72. See, e.g., 153 CONG. REC. E151 (statement of Rep. Tiahrt); Small

Business Energy Priorities: Hearing on H.R. 3221 Before the H. Comm. On
Small Bus., 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Lee Fuller, Vice President,
Independent Petroleum Association of America).
73. See, e.g., 153 CONG. REC. E151.
74. S. 1419, 110th Cong. (2007).
75. H.R. 3221, 110th Cong. §§ 10001-03 (2007).
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and the Renewable Energy and Energy Conservation Tax Act of
2007.76 The latter bill called for a less effective, one yearextension of the PTC (expiring in 2008).77 Further debate
produced the revised Clean Energy Act, which initiated more
congressional bickering and faced predictably strong opposition
from the White House.78
President Bush’s Administration
threatened to veto any legislation sent to his office that resembled
the revised Clean Energy Act, mostly because of the proposed
repeal of oil and natural gas subsidies; this threat offered support
to those congressmen advocating the same position.79 The final
product, the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, was
left completely devoid of a federal RPS, and more importantly,
lacked an extension of the PTC.80
B.

Bittersweet Victory

The legislative travails of the 110th Congress came to
fruition in the Energy Independence and Security Act, but at a
heavy cost to the Production Tax Credit. Despite the best efforts
of dedicated, mostly Democratic Congressmen, the PTC was left
in legislative purgatory once again, with only a few short weeks
until its pending expiration.

76. H.R. 2776, 110th Cong. (2007).
77. HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE, H.R. 2776 RENEWABLE ENERGY AND
ENERGY CONSERVATION TAX ACT OF 2007 (2007), http://waysandmeans.
house.gov/media/pdf/110/2776/Markup%20Summary.pdf. See also Summary of
H.R. 2776: Renewable Energy and Energy Conservation Tax Act of 2007,
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/02776%20Summary% 20revised.pdf (last visited
Aug.. 15, 2010); Statement of Administration Policy, H.R. 2776 & H.R. 3221
(Aug. 3, 2007).
78. See generally 153 CONG. REC. S15385 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 2007); 153 CONG.
REC. E2552 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 2007) (statement of Rep. McCollum); 153 CONG.
REC. E2550 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 2007) (statement of Rep. Buyer); 153 CONG. REC.
S15004 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 2007) (statement of Rep. Domenici, Rep. McConnell,
Sen. Reid); Statement of Administration Policy, H.R. 6 (Dec. 6, 2007).
79. See 153 CONG. REC. E2582-01 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 2007) (statement of Rep.
Tiahrt); 153 CONG. REC. H14260-01 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 2007) (statement of Rep.
Peterson); 153 CONG. REC. E1818 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 2007) (statement of Rep.
Manzullo).
80. See FRED SISSINE, ENERGY INDEPENDENCE AND SECURITY ACT OF 2007: A
SUMMARY OF MAJOR PROVISIONS (CRS Report for Congress) (2007).
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Legislators, though, were thrilled over the consensus reached
by Congress in effectuating this landmark piece of legislation.81
The final product was an admirable attempt at revising America’s
energy policy and working to reconstruct the nation’s energy
infrastructure. Legislators, by all accounts, expressed their
satisfaction over the resulting Act, but many remained upset over
the failure to include PTC provisions in addition to the RPS.82
Recognizing this failure as the result of pure political posturing
and special interest-petitioning, these lawmakers were regretful
of another missed opportunity to support an unquestionably
beneficial industry struggling to gain a foothold on the national
energy stage; at the same time, many expressed optimism over
the possibility of pushing the PTC extension through in
subsequent legislation.83 Most frustrating for advocates of the
PTC was Congress’ almost universal support for the PTC and
generally widespread recognition of its positive impact on
renewable energy development on a national, and ultimately
international, scale.84
Arguably, they understood that a
compromise could, and must, be reached and planned
accordingly.
When the smoke had cleared, 2007’s EISA accomplished
nothing in terms of the PTC or RPS. While budgetary concerns
and funding issues were legitimate, they were not
insurmountable hurdles.
Political motivations and special
interest profits signaled the death knell of the PTC in 2007.
Luckily, an altered political landscape combined with an
intensified awareness of both environmental and global climate
change problems has rewritten the future of PTC legislation in
2008. Notwithstanding these encouraging developments, the
future of the PTC remains uncertain, an uncertainty that works
to temper the effectiveness of the provision itself.

81. See, e.g., 153 CONG. REG. S15647 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 2007) (statement of
Rep. Feingold).
82. Id.
83. See generally 153 CONG. REC. S15421 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 2007).
84. Id.
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Recent Legislation

2008 heralded a spate of energy-related bills which included
provisions for the Production Tax Credit extension.85 None of
these early attempts resulted in a passable bill, and the PTC was
once again—for a short time at least—held hostage by
uncompromising partisan politics. For several months, questions
about the tax credit, federal energy subsidies, and revenue offset
provisions plagued the congressional floors. This political tennis
match rendered the outlook for a quick resolution to the pending
PTC expiration very much in doubt. The first attempt was the
Clean Energy Tax Stimulus Act of 2008.86 This bill was moribund
from its introduction onto the Senate floor, as the House refused
to even recognize the tax title provisions contained therein.
The next congressional attempt was the stillborn Renewable
Energy and Energy Conservation Tax Act.87 Congressional
leaders, frustrated by months of futile negotiations, did not relent
in their efforts to extend the PTC. Nonetheless, the most
intractable issues remained the same in this bill as in all of its
predecessors. A large portion of the funds for the PTC extension
were slated to come from the closing of some “tax loopholes that
have been lining Big Oil’s already gold-filled pockets.”88 The bill
was prepared to eliminate Section 199 from the Internal Revenue
Tax Code,89 a federal handout for the “domestic production
activities” of several large integrated oil companies. House
Republicans offered a broad panoply of specious arguments in
defense of those subsidies, claiming irreparable and unwarranted
harm to domestic employment industries and a rapid increase in

85. See generally FRED SISSINE, ET AL., ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLE
ENERGY LEGISLATION IN THE 110TH CONGRESS (CRS Report for Congress) (2008).
See also Statement of Administration Policy, S. 3044 (June 10, 2008).
86. Clean Energy Tax Stimulus Act of 2008, S. 2821, 110th Cong. (2008).
87. H.R. 5351, 110th Cong. (2008). See 154 CONG. REC. H1091-01 (daily ed.
Feb. 27, 2008) (statement of Rep. Ryan); see also Statement of Administration
Policy, H.R. 5351 (Feb. 26, 2008).
88. DANIEL WEISS & ALEXANDRA KOUGENTAKIS, CENTER FOR AMERICAN
PROGRESS, INVESTMENTS FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY, NOT LOOPHOLES FOR BIG OIL
(2008), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/02/invest
ments_energy.html.
89. I.R.C. § 199 (2006).
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The Bush Administration
fuel prices across the board.90
expressed similar disdain for the offset provisions, and
threatened a presidential veto.91 Another proposed rescission
would work to limit claims on the foreign tax credits by oil and
gas companies.92 The PTC, which was for two cents per kilowatthour through the end of 2011, was not meant to be; H.R. 5351
was never sent to the Senate.93
Following this failed effort, the Senate reintroduced its Clean
Energy Tax Stimulus Act of 2008, now under the guise of H.R.
3221,94 as a less-expensive and more streamlined version of H.R.
5351.95 Even now, without any oil and gas revenue offsets, the
bill failed to win bipartisan support, and the House dropped all
energy tax provisions in its own response, the Housing Rescue
and Foreclosure Prevention Act.96 The Senate then accepted this
bill without the one-year tax credit extension.97
With renewed determination not a month subsequent, the
House passed the Energy Tax and Extenders Act,98 which again
hoped to effectuate a one-year extension of the PTC. The bill
approached the controversial problem of offsets slightly
differently. Rather than focusing on the contentious repeals of oil
and natural gas subsidies in the tax code, H.R. 6049 targeted two
potential revenue streams: (1) the bill “would tax individuals on a
current basis if such individuals receive deferred compensation
from a tax indifferent [foreign] party” (estimated to generate
$24.289 billion over 10 years); and (2) a delay of the
“implementation of worldwide allocation of interest”, estimated to
raise $29.962 billion over 10 years.99 When compared to the

90. See 154 CONG. REC. H1091-1128 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 2008).
91. Statement of Administration Policy, H.R. 5351 (Feb. 26, 2008).
92. See SISSINE, ET AL., supra note 85, at 7.
93. See id. at 6.
94. Clean Energy Tax Stimulus Act of 2008, S. 2821, 110th Cong. (2008).
95. See SISSINE, CLEAN ENERGY ACT, supra note 69, at 11.
96. Housing Rescue and Foreclosure Prevention Act of 2008, H.R. 3221,
110th Cong. (2008).
97. S. 2821 § 101.
98. Energy Tax and Extenders Act of 2008, H.R. 6049, 110th Cong. (2008).
99. Committee on Ways and Means, H.R. 6049 Energy and Tax Extenders
Act of 2008 (Summary). May 16, 2008, 11-12, available at http://waysandmeans.
house.gov/media/pdf/110/bill.pdf. Both of these proposals looked to close
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proposed cost of $7 billion for the renewable energy PTC, one
would expect both sides to be relatively satisfied, considering the
oil and gas subsidies were preserved. Still, the Senate refused to
vote on H.R. 6049,100 and even failed to pass their own version of
the bill, the Energy Independence and Tax Relief Act of 2008.101
The legislative gridlock dragged on well beyond the summer
months.102 Finally the Senate passed its version of H.R. 6049,
perfected by Amendment 5635.103 The bill was substantially
similar to the Energy Tax and Extenders Act, but notably did not
fully offset the estimated costs of the proposed tax provisions.
Yet even with only a partial offset of oil and gas subsidy repeals,
the Office of the President again threatened a veto, reaffirming a
pattern of the administration.104 In contrast, the House bill was
unwavering in its demand to allocate revenues for every proposed
tax credit, as opposed to simply letting some credits go unfunded
(at least initially).105 The final attempt to extend the PTC came
by way of the House’s Renewable Energy and Job Creation Tax
Act.106 The bill proposed an extension of the credit, broadened the
potential applicant pool to new renewable sources like tidal
power, and would also cap the aggregate amount of tax credits to
35% of present value of the project’s costs.107 As expected, the
loopholes in the tax policy, most effectively exploited by well-compensated
executives working for foreign commercial enterprises.
100. See SISSINE,, CLEAN ENERGY ACT, supra note 69, at 13.
101. The Energy Independence and Tax Relief Act of 2008, H.R. 6049, S. 3125,
110th Cong. (2008).
102. The Senate failed to pass the Jobs, Energy, Families, and Disaster Relief
Act of 2008, S. 3335, 110th Cong. (2008), while the House passed a parallel but
ultimately non-functioning Comprehensive American Energy Security and
Consumer Protection Act of 2008, H.R. 6899, 110th Cong. (2008). Both bills were
fundamentally similar to H.R. 6049, 110th Cong. (2008).
103. Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008, S.Amdt. 5635, 110th
Cong. (2008).
104. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION
POLICY ON S.AMDT. TO H.R. 6049—ENERGY IMPROVEMENT AND EXTENSION ACT OF
2008 AND TAX EXTENDERS AND ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX RELIEF TAX ACT OF
2008 (2008), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/sap/1102/saphr6049-s.pdf.
105. See H.R. 6049, 110th Cong. (2008).
106. Renewable Energy and Job Creation Tax Act of 2008, H.R. 7060, 110th
Cong. (2008).
107. Committee on Ways and Means, H.R. 7060 Renewable Energy and Job
Creation Tax Act of 2008 (Summary). Sept. 25, 2008, 1-2, available at
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Executive Branch warned of an impending veto.108 Despite the
general similarities concerning the PTC provisions between the
House and Senate version, proponents still expected the typical
impasse, with Congress potentially tabling the legislation until
the beginning of its next term. Fortunately for the PTC (and
almost no one else), the collapse of the international financial
system inadvertently produced a valuable opportunity.
D.

Fallout from the Global Economic Recession

Rather than waiting to restructure the divergent bills into a
more palatable compromise, Congress injected several of the
provisions (now in the form of pork) into the federal bailout
packages. Congress’ first version of the bailout bill did include
PTC provisions, but did little else to address the true capital
liquidity trap spurred by the credit crisis.109 As the nation slipped
further into economic recession, this Economic Stimulus Act of
2008 was ill-equipped to handle the severity of capital shortages
throughout global financial institutions.110 Congress’ second
attempt, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, was
unanimously and expeditiously approved by both chambers of
Congress.111
While ultimately designed to relieve sinking
corporations of their “troubled assets,” the Act also included the
Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008, which
prominently featured a one-year extension of the PTC.112
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/pdf/110/7060sum.pdf (the bill also
suggested a number of different revenue provisions, including a freezing of the §
199 oil and gas subsidy at 6%; see id. at 10-12).
108. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION
POLICY ON H.R. 7060 (2008), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
legislative/sap/110-2/saphr7060-h.pdf.
109. Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-185, 122 Stat. 613 (2008).
See also Mark Sunshine, Will Paulson’s Two Plans Unplug the ‘Liquidity Trap’?,
Economix Blog, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2008; David Sanger, Spending More than
$800 Billion Is the Easy Part, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2009, at A11.
110. Edmund L. Andrews, Recession Began Last December, Economists Say,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2008, at A1.
111. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122
Stat. 3765 (2008).
112. H.R. 6049, 110th Cong. (2008); CLEAN TECH ADVISORY, GOODWIN PROCTOR,
CONGRESS EXTENDS AND APPROVES NEW ALTERNATIVE ENERGY TAX CREDITS
(2008). See also Summary of The Energy Improvement and Extension Act of

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss3/7

22

2010]

THREE SHEETS TO THE WIND

805

Predictably, the Act broadened the scope of the PTC to include
non-renewables, a ploy to entice the House Republicans to vote
for the bailout despite the inclusion of renewable tax credits.113
But the law did mercifully repeal more than $17 billion in tax
subsidies to the oil and natural gas industries to pay for the tax
incentive provisions.114
The renewable energy industry and lawmakers alike rejoiced
at the news of this extension, even as the national economic
infrastructure collapsed around it.115 Yet despite its one-year
extension, once again Congress strove for the minimum and
incidentally retarded further renewable investment. However,
with the subsequent passage of the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act (ARRA)—the federal stimulus bill meant to
invigorate the flailing American economy in February 2009—the
2.1 cent per kilowatt hour PTC was extended for another three
years, until 2012.116 The total cost of the renewables tax credit
program is estimated to run at $13.143 billion over 10 years.117
Understandably, the bill was met with enthusiasm from
numerous renewable energy groups and investors.118
2008, available at http://www.finance.senate.gov/20and%20Extension%20Act.
pdf.
113. Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008, §§ 101-05 (2008).
114. FRED SISSINE, CRS REPORT, RENEWABLE ENERGY: BACKGROUND AND
ISSUES FOR THE 110TH CONGRESS 24 (2008).
115. Cf. Economic Stimulus Bill Disappoints Congressional, DOCUMENTS AND
PUBLICATIONS, Feb. 9, 2009 (Sen. Grassley, frustrated with Congress’ initial
refusal to include PTC provisions in the stimulus plan, remarked that the
outcome was “disappointing and shortsighted because my amendment was
about fostering the kind of entrepreneurial activity that sustains and creates
both jobs and taxpayers, while also strengthening an environmentally friendly
energy source for the future.” Grassley is widely recognized as “the father of the
wind energy tax credit.”).
116. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, Pub. L. 111-5, H.R. 1, 111th
Cong. (2009) (Div. B, §§ 1101-1102). The IRS also publishes updated inflation
factors, adjusted figures, and reference prices for the tax credit each year. For a
description of these figures, see BARNES & THORNBURG, LLP, IRS ISSUES ANNUAL
INFLATION FACTOR AND REFERENCE PRICES FOR SECTION 45 PRODUCTION TAX
CREDITS (2010), available at http://www.btlaw.com/files/ALERT%20-%20Renew
able%20Energy_IRS%20Annual%20Inflation%20Factor%20and%20Reference%
20Prices.pdf. This figure has been adjusted for 2010 to 2.2 cents per kWh.
117. Congressman Sestak Votes for Urgently Needed Stimulus Plan to
Rebuild Economic Security, STATE NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 14, 2009.
118. See, e.g., Press release from Vestas.
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Clearly the Great Recession has been a mixed blessing for
the renewables industry. Many national governments stocked
their stimulus programs with generous subsidies and incentives
119
for the renewables industry.
In addition to extending the PTC,
ARRA lengthened qualification deadlines and expanded the pool
120
of potential renewable applicants.
Moreover, the Act provides
an attractive alternative to the PTC, in that eligible taxpayers
can elect to receive a 30% grant from the U.S. Department of the
Treasury instead of the PTC, to cover the costs of capital
121
investments.
This provision was aimed at bolstering the
renewable power industry, which suffered from both the loss of
investor financing and the reduced demand for tax credits in
general. Indeed, the oversubscribed program “may have helped
directly motivate more than 20% of the 10,000 MW of wind
122
capacity additions in 2009.”
This cash grant program underscores the danger facing the
U.S. renewables industry as a result of the recession. Precisely
because of the high upfront capital costs of renewable expansion,
developers are dependent upon the availability of inexpensive
debt leveraging that can be capitalized over the useful
operational life of their facilities. As liquid resources become
scarcer and banks refuse to lend, renewables are caught in the

119. See, e.g., Good Policy, and Bad, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 3, 2009, available
http://www.economist.com/specialreports/displaystory.cfm?story_id=E1_TQJ
JQRTR (noting that “[g]reen stimulus money globally adds up to around $163
billion . . . of which more than $100 billion is being spent in America and
China”).
120. DSIREUSA.org, Renewable Electricity Production Tax Credit (PTC),
http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?Incentive_Code=US13F (last
visited Aug. 20, 2010).
121. See id; Pub. L. 111-5 § 1603. Per usual, developers can also choose to
receive the Investment Tax Credit, but may now also convert that credit into the
30% cash grant, for facilities placed in service in both 2009 and 2010.
122. Berkeley Lab’s Preliminary Evaluation of Recovery Act Grant Program
Finds Positive Effects on Renewable Energy Capacity and Jobs, STATES NEWS
SERVICE, May 11, 2010.

at
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123

Moreover, even though interest rates have been
crossfire.
hovering at all-time lows, lenders are levying far higher risk
124
premiums that negate the potential of cheap debt financing. As
a result, global investment has plummeted, falling by 53% to
125
$13.3 billion in the first quarter of 2009 alone.
While
investments are slowly recovering, the Obama administration
should not hesitate to continue to explore new creative options for
stimulating development while working to cast off the burden of
many of its most inefficient and counterproductive subsidies.
III. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The pervasive fragility of the economy, which has severely
reduced capital investments, compounds this uncertainty.126 The
fate of renewable investments is inextricably tied to the financial
crisis, ironic in light of the fact that the PTC’s recent extension
was precipitated by the desperate federal bailout. At a time when
credit lines are frozen and capital has dried up, enticing
renewable developers and operators to invest heavily in capitalintensive projects is an unattractive proposition.127 And at risk is

123. See also The Green Slump, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 3, 2009, available at
http://www.economist.com/specialreports/displaystory.cfm?story_id=E1_TQJJQ
RDN (Robert Clover, director of alternative-energy equity research at HSBC,
notes that “some of the banks that suffered worst during the crisis—RBS,
Lehman Brothers, Washington Mutual and Fortis—were also among the biggest
in clean-energy finance.”).
124. NEW ENERGY FINANCE, GLOBAL TRENDS IN SUSTAINABLE ENERGY 2009 11
(2009).
125. Id. at 10 (as compared to the same period in 2008).
126. See Jenny Mandel, Renewable Energy: Hit Hard by Financial Crisis,
Industry Seeks Help Again from Congress, GREENWIRE, Nov. 13, 2008 (PTC
“requires developers of unprofitable projects to team with large, money-making
businesses that can trade cash for credits to reduce their own tax liabilities. But
in the last six months, linchpins of the tax-equity market have fallen, leaving
renewable developers unable to claim the incentives”).
127. Keith Johnson, Financial Fallout: Why Renewable Energy Has the Blues,
Environmental Capital Blog, WALL STREET J., http://blogs.wsj.com/environ
mentalcapital/2008/10/21/financial-fallout-why-renewable-energy-has-the-blues/
(Oct. 21, 2008, 11:03 AM),. Johnson describes the vulnerability of renewable
energy to credit crunches, as a majority of the cost of renewable development is
in the form of initial capital investment; “[w]hen capital costs are huge, the cost
of capital becomes doubly important.” Cf. Bill Chameides, Renewable Energy: A
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the progress achieved over the last few decades, and the
investments already made in large-scale projects. Regardless of
the volatility of oil prices, the fossil fuel-based industries long ago
achieved economies of scale and remain the more cost-effective
option for any number of projects, whether it is electricity
generation or processed fuels. To that end, it is more important
than ever for the PTC to stimulate economic growth by
generating job creation within the renewable industry (e.g.
through wind turbine or solar panel manufacturing and
installation).
Guaranteeing the future of the PTC and, consequently,
renewable energy investment, rests on developing a revenue
stream that will not exacerbate longstanding political issues or
agitate partisan special interests. Nonetheless, compromise is
critical. The easiest way to pay for PTCs is to repeal the
subsidies that have already been granted to pre-existing and
well-established industries, namely petroleum, natural gas, coal,
and nuclear.128 However, there are numerous other options that
can help to ease the transition to a more stable PTC.
A.

Subsidy Repeal

Many of the conventional energy industries have had the
decades-long endorsement and financial backing of the federal
government, and have achieved great economies of scale through
years of trial and error.129 Those mistakes are much more easily
Growth Industry in a Contracting Economy?, THE GREEN GROK, Oct. 22, 2008,
http://www.nicholas.duke.edu/nicholas/insider/thegreengrok/renewable
investment.
128. See, e.g., Energy Policy Act of 2005 §§ 342-43. See also Press Release,
Energy Info. Admin., Federal Energy Subsidies (Dec. 11, 1995).
129. See Window on State Government, Susan Combs, Texas Comptroller of
Public Accounts, Chapter 28, Government Financial Subsidies, http://www.
window.state.tx.us/specialrpt/energy/subsidies/ (last visited Aug. 14, 2010)
(noting that in 2006, oil, gas, and coal, the predominant fossil fuels exploited on
a large scale by the U.S., received a total of 49.9% of federal taxpayer subsidies,
whereas conventional renewables, not including nuclear or ethanol, received a
paltry 9.9% by comparison); REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS, UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FEDERAL ELECTRICITY SUBSIDIES:
INFORMATION ON RESEARCH FUNDING, TAX EXPENDITURES, AND OTHER ACTIVITIES
SUPPORT ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION 2-5 (2007), available at
THAT
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08102.pdf (besides having an overwhelming edge
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absorbed when there is ample federal subsidization of costs, a
reprieve that the renewable industry sorely lacks but desperately
needs. Furthermore, the technologies associated with these
enterprises have been perfected to the point of scalability, in
contrast to the unyielding, prohibitive costs of renewable
developments.130 With these considerations in mind, there is no
escaping the fact that to adequately fund the PTC, Congress must
repeal part or all of those subsidies currently available that
qualify, in effect, as handouts to matured industries (i.e. coal, oil,
and nuclear).131
In particular, there are two tax provisions for fossil fuels that
should be the subject of extensive review. The first is the federal
depletion allowance offered to “mines, oil and gas wells, other
natural deposits, and timber.”132 Recognized since 1913, “it is
based on the theory that the extraction of minerals gradually
exhausts the capital investment in the mineral deposit.”133 As a
result, Congress has offered these fossil fuel producers a tax
deduction based on that rate of mineral depletion. There is
further tax advantage in the fact that producers are able to
presently deduct their depletion allowances, rather than
capitalize them over time. The second is the aforementioned
domestic production activities subsidy.134 Both of these subsidies

in research and development funding, fossil fuel-based electricity generation
received the largest proportion of tax expenditures, totaling almost $13.7 billion
over a five-year span, compared to the $2.8 billion spent on renewable tax
expenditures); Bryan Walsh, Is Nuclear Power Viable?, TIME MAGAZINE, June
06, 2008, available at http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,181
2540,00.html (noting that “the U.S. nuclear industry has received $100 billion in
government subsidies over the past half-century”).
130. See, e.g., R. MARGOLIS & J. ZUBOY, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB.,
NONTECHNICAL BARRIERS TO SOLAR ENERGY USE: REVIEW OF RECENT LITERATURE
(2006), available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy07osti/40116.pdf (listing high
initial up-front costs as one of the most powerful barriers to renewable energy
investment, along with inability to secure financing and insufficient government
endorsement).
131. Wind Power Needs Federal Production Tax Credit Extension, THE
OREGONIAN, Nov. 10, 2003 (discussing how “[c]oal, natural gas, and other fossil
fuels for years have enjoyed significant tax advantages . . . [which are]
memorialized in the tax code, with no expiration date”).
132. 26 U.S.C. § 611(a) (2006).
133. Comm’r v. Sw. Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308, 353 (1956).
134. I.R.C. § 199 (2006).
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should henceforth be discontinued. While this approach has
obviously proved problematic during congressional hearings, the
substantial expenditures avoided by the government may be used
to offset the comparatively moderate cost of the PTC. Further, it
is a misguided policy of inefficient economics to continue
extending the PTC to the nuclear and coal industries.135
Moreover, Congress would do well to reduce subsidization of
environmentally harmful enterprises, most notably timber and
ore mining.136 While resource mining on federal lands has
historically been a cause of great consternation,137 U.S. Forest
Service policies have stirred up far more controversy over the last
thirty years. By selling timber on protected federal lands at
below-market prices to maintain their federal budgets, the USFS
program costs U.S. taxpayers billions of dollars over several
years.138 This multi-billion dollar subsidy could instead be
directed towards renewable energy investment under the general
auspices of a public infrastructure program.
This would
simultaneously help pave the way for a cleaner energy future,
and would work to soften or mitigate the deleterious
environmental effects of logging and mining.

135. See Ben Geman, Wind Power: Industry Reports Sharp Growth, Renews
Plea for Tax Certainty, GREENWIRE, Jan. 23, 2007 (currently the PTC is offered
for up to 6,000 MW of new nuclear generating capacity). Under 26 U.S.C. § 45,
refined coal producers may claim a PTC of $4.375 per ton.
136. See TAXPAYERS FOR COMMON SENSE, TONGASS LOGGING SUBSIDIES—COST
TO TAXPAYERS, http://65.110.78.8/Library/Documents/upload/Factsheet-Tongass
Subsidies-TCS.pdf.
137. See, e.g., MARC HUMPHRIES & CAROL H. VINCENT, CRS ISSUE BRIEF FOR
CONGRESS, MINING ON FEDERAL LANDS (2001).
138. Native Forest Council, The Problem: Timber Sales on Public Lands,
http://www.forestcouncil.org/learn/features/zerocut/problem.html (last visited
Aug. 14, 2010) (discussing how “[t]he result is a public lands logging program
that operates at a net loss of nearly $1 billion each year.” See also R. NEIL
SAMPSON AND LESTER A. DECOSTER, IDAHO FOREST PRODUCTS COMMISSION,
FOREST HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES (1998) (on the deleterious 1995 Salvage
Rider provision which legitimized the USFS’s wasteful timber policies); Forest
Advocate, Economic Case Against Logging National Forests http://tremont.
wikispaces.com/logging (last visited Aug. 14, 2010) (criticizing how “[t]he Forest
Service has been unable to provide data on the cost of its timber sale program
since 1998. At that time, the agency reported a $126 million loss. An
independent analysis found losses to be three times that amount.”).
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Wasteful agricultural subsidies exceeding $15 billion in 2009
139
alone are prime candidates for reconsideration; indeed, of this,
140
$147.3 million went to Brazilian cotton farmers. From 19952009, the U.S. Department of Agriculture distributed over $245
141
billion to American farmers, with the top 10 percent of these
142
(corporate) recipients receiving 74% of all farm subsidies. These
subsidies are clearly distributed to a miniscule subset of farmers,
are indifferent to environmentally damaging processes, and
severely distort agricultural markets in a plainly ludicrous
fashion. The entire scheme for agricultural subsidization is
outdated and self-defeating, and should be wholly restructured to
allow for the funding of the PTC—a mechanism that,
notwithstanding criticism, lays the foundation for a sustainable
energy infrastructure well into the future.
B.

Infrastructure Bank

Another potential source of revenue could be explored within
the confines of the proposed Infrastructure Bank.143 President
Barack H. Obama, while on the campaign trail, endorsed the idea
of chartering a National Infrastructure Bank. The concept was
first proposed over a year before by Senators Christopher Dodd,
(D-CT), and Chuck Hagel, (R-Neb), in their sponsored bill, the
National Infrastructure Bank Act of 2007, and has been widely
139.
Environmental
Working
Group,
Farm $ubsidy Database,,
http://farm.ewg.org/region.php?fips=00000&progcode=total&yr=2009
(last
visited Aug. 20, 2010). See also Good Policy, and Bad, supra note 119 (noting
that America’s support for corn ethanol is equally misguided and wasteful,
producing little in the way of substantive results while raising global food prices
and lending a negative connotation to all carbon mitigation measures).
140. Michael Grunwald, Why the U.S. Is Also Giving Brazilians Farm
Subsidies, TIME MAGAZINE, Apr. 9, 2010, available at http://www.time.com/
time/nation/article/ 0,8599,1978963,00.html (in order to avoid potential trade
distortions and the associated World Trade Organization violations, the US
government must subsidize Brazilian cotton growers in order to continue
subsidizing its own farmers).
141. Karen Auge, Spoiled system: Eating healthier comes at a price for
families, DENVER POST, Sept. 5, 2010, http://www.denverpost.com/ci_15996357#
ixzz0yrIsQ17R.
142. See Farming: Farm Subsidies, EWG.ORG, http://www.ewg.org
/farmsubsidies (last visited Oct. 1, 2010).
143. Bob Herbert, Not a Moment Too Soon, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2008, at A31.
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supported by governors, congressional leaders, and private
financial institutions.144 Such a national bank, featuring a
bipartisan board of directors, would establish “a new method
through which the Federal government can finance infrastructure
projects of substantial regional or national significance.”145 The
bank would foreseeably issue taxable, tax-credit bonds (with a
ceiling of up to $60 billion) to help finance these infrastructure
projects, some of which might very easily be large-scale regional
renewable energy developments.146
The Infrastructure Bank would conceivably be used to fund
national infrastructure projects in a controlled, calculated way.147
To that end, the bank could spur renewable development by
offering low-interest loans to private developer partners so as to
fund projects at a lower rate than a conventional bank might
offer. Further, the interest from those large-scale loans might
then be used to subsidize the PTC available to those very same
projects. An environmental impact statement will be required
under the Infrastructure Bank’s charter, and the clear benefits
from clean energy production might weigh heavily against any
environmental costs to be incurred (with high value placed on
associated
security,
reliability,
and
efficiency).148
The
Infrastructure Bank would be following its mandate to stimulate
infrastructure projects and national development, while at the
same time establishing a clean energy framework, stimulating
private investment, and strengthening the fundamentals of the
flaccid economy.149

144. National Infrastructure Bank Act of 2007, S. 1926, 110th Cong. (2007);
Humberto Sanchez, Governors Suggest Creation of National Infrastructure
Bank, NATIONAL JOURNAL’S CONGRESSDAILY, Dec. 2, 2008; Deutsche Bank Calls
for U.S. ‘Green’ Infrastructure Bank, CARBON CONTROL NEWS, Nov. 24, 2008.
145. See SENATOR CHRISTOPHER J. DODD & SENATOR CHUCK HAGEL, NATIONAL
INFRASTRUCTURE BANK ACT OF 2007, available at http://dodd.senate.gov/multi
media/2007/ 080107_InfrastructurePacket.pdf.
146. Audrey Dutton & Peter Schroeder, Infrastructure: National
Reinvestment Bank Plan Losing Traction, Rendell Warns, THE BOND BUYER,
Jan. 13, 2009.
147. See generally FELIX ROHATYN, BOLD ENDEAVORS 224-27 (2009).
148. Id.
149. See Current Energy Security Challenges: Hearing Before the S. Energy
and Natural Res. Comm., 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Eric Schwartz,
Member, Energy Security Leadership Council).
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President Obama has mentioned numerous times the
country’s desperate need for an upgrade of its existing electricity
transmission and distribution lines, and has been a vocal
supporter of the conversion to a national “smart grid.”150 The
latest economic stimulus plan proposed by Congress
encouragingly includes not only more than $20 billion, part of
which will go towards extension of the renewable energy PTC, but
also $32 billion to fund a “smart electricity grid” to reduce energy
waste and make long-distance transfer much more feasible on a
national scale.151 In conjunction with a generous, permanent
PTC, the Infrastructure Bank-funding of smart grid technology
would exponentially benefit the renewable energy industry and
the larger national community by expanding and upgrading
energy markets. The benefits of these programs—combined with
a federal Renewable Portfolio Standard energy quota—would
produce a synergistic effect and invite both public and private
investments with the lure of steady profits and consistent return
on initial capital outlay.
C.

Other Funding Mechanisms

The easiest and most obvious source of cost offsetting for the
tax expenditure would be repealing the oil, coal, and natural gas
subsidies mentioned above.152 Besides that, there are a number of
opportunities for defraying the costs of the program through
other taxes and revenue-generating actions.
The federal
government might use a portion of the proceeds generated from
carbon auctions under a greenhouse gas cap and trade program
(e.g. one similar to the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, or
150. See, e.g., Kate Galbraith, Obama Speech Pushes Clean Energy, Green A
Blog About Energy & the Environment ,N.Y. TIMES http://greeninc.blogs.
nytimes.com/2009/01/08/obama-speech-pushes-clean-energy/?scp=1&sq=smart
%20grid%20obama&st=cse (Jan. 8, 2009, 2:41 PM) (indicating that Presidentelect Obama, in appraising economic prospects, favored the transition to a smart
grid to “make the country less vulnerable to blackouts or even attacks,” in
addition to the easily realizable cost-effectiveness of the switch). See also Kate
Galbraith, On the Road to a Smart Grid, Green A Blog About Energy & the
Environment, N.Y. TIMES http://greeninc.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/12/08/on-theroad-to-a-smart-grid/ (Dec. 8, 2008, 1:06 PM)
151. Stimulus plan highlights, CHICAGO DAILY HERALD, Jan. 16, 2009 at 2.
152. Section III.A, supra.
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RGGI) to help defray the costs of a PTC program.153 Putting a
predictable, fixed price on carbon is a key part of stimulating
significant renewable development, especially during a time of
154
economic recession.
The PTC, by itself, is simply ineffective
over the long term to spur true development of renewable
capacity, given the ability of companies to largely externalize the
155
true costs of burning fossil fuel sources. Pricing carbon sends a
signal to the marketplace that investment in clean renewable
fuels is a wise business decision and highly cost-effective over the
life of the development. Whether this cap and trade system is
nationally–or regionally–based, the effect of the price signal
should be recognizable.
To that end, the federal government might explore the
possibility of delegating the PTC provision to the states or
regional entities themselves; as is, the states are often bettersituated to decide exactly which industries might derive the most
156
benefit from the PTC.
Regional agreements such as RGGI are
proving themselves to be highly valuable in subsidizing energy
efficiency projects, as industry polluters are forced to account for
their negative externalities while simultaneously funding the
next generation of renewable and energy efficiency
technologies.157 There is no reason that these proceeds cannot be
153. New York State, Department of Environmental Conservation,, Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI): Carbon Dioxide Cap and Trade Program,
http://www.dec.ny.gov/energy/rggi.html (last visited Aug. 19, 2010).
154. See also Sean Casten, Prices vs. contracts: Why good CO2 policy needs
complex financial markets, GRIST, May 25, 2010, available at http://www.grist.
org/article/prices-v-contracts-why-good-co2-policy-needs-complex-financialmarkets/ (asserting that in addition to carbon prices, long-dated contracts for
CO2 reduction and a sophisticated financial market of derivatives, futures, and
other instruments are necessary for achieving substantive renewables
investment).
155. See Good Policy, and Bad, supra note 119 (noting that without subsidies,
onshore wind energy “needs a carbon price of $38” to make investment in
renewable capacity worthwhile, while that figure rises to $196 for solar cells).
156. Currently, companies are not excluded from claiming the federal PTC
even if they have also collected on similar state or local tax credits. See IRS,
Rev. Rule 2006-9: Certain State Incentives Do Not Trigger a Reduction in PTCs,
available at http://www.novoco.com/energy/resource_files/irs_guidance/rulings/
rr-06-09.pdf (§ 45 credit is not reduced under § 45(b)(3)).
157. ClimateChangeCorp Climate News for Business, Markets, RGGI: So far,
so good, http://www.climatec hangecorp.com/content.asp?ContentID=5757 (last
visited Aug. 15, 2010) (discussing how “all of the 12.6 million vintage 2009
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used to fund the PTC provision above any other similar projects.
The Northeast states are ideally suited to implement the
proposed setup, as electricity generated across vast swaths of
rural areas (wind farms) and geothermal installed capacity can
provide electricity reliably to concentrated hubs across counties
without disrupting pre-existing infrastructure.158
A carbon tax could work independently or complementarily to
level the competitive playing field for more equalized renewable
market penetration.159
“Society is best served by market
transactions that reflect both the private and the external costs of
producing goods and services.”160 A carbon tax would force
greenhouse gas emitting sources to internalize their previously
unregulated
externalities,
thus
finally
incorporating
environmental quality degradation into the real price of power
generation. In coordination with a number of other efforts, many
of which are described below, the levelized costs of coal-based
electricity generation will more accurately reflect reality.161

allowances offered by participating states . . . were sold at $3.07 each, well above
the minimum of $1.86 set by the initiative.”). As proceeds are used for
“consumer benefit or strategic energy purposes,” these high revenue returns are
very good news for renewable energy and energy efficiency programs set to be
instituted throughout the region.
158. Fred Pearce, As Europe Fiddles, U.S. May Take Lead on Climate Change,
YALE ENV’T 360, Jan. 12, 2009, available at http://e360.yale.edu/content/
feature.msp?id=2108. Another area of energy potential, for the entire West
Coast and beyond, is solar thermal panels—“the United States could get 90 per
cent of its energy from covering just 10 per cent of the Nevada desert with
mirrors.”
159. See generally, CRAIG HANSON & JAMES HENDRICKS, JR., TAXING CARBON TO
FINANCE TAX REFORM-, (2006); Energy Tax Policy, ISSUES IN SCIENCE & TECH.,
Jan. 1, 2008 (“Alternative energy subsidies that are currently in place play
political favorites and would be unnecessary if the types of energy that
policymakers view as undesirable were taxed at an efficient rate. With
undesirable forms of energy more costly, the market, rather than government
officials, would determine which alternatives are best.”).
160. JOEL DARMSTATDER, RESOURCE FOR THE FUTURE, THE ECONOMIC AND
POLICY SETTING OF RENEWABLE ENERGY 7 (2003).
161. HOWARD GRUENSPECHT, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, THE ROLE OF TAX
INCENTIVES IN ENERGY POLICY 6 (2001) (finding that “more than 90% of the
differential reflected the imputed value of the impact of increased global
warming from fossil fuel use, estimated at roughly $18 per ton of carbon emitted
to the atmosphere”).
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Academics, economists, and politicians all disagree as to the
optimal suite of policies and incentives necessary to mitigate
GHG emissions and foster development of renewables in the most
efficient way possible, without unfairly distorting the free
162
market.
Ideally, a hybrid system would be enacted, with a
carbon tax applicable to some economic sectors and a cap and
trade system at some level covering the rest, with a range of
specific, targeted subsidies and incentives playing a supporting
role. Arguably, price distortions as a result of the PTC itself do
tend to favor one form of power production at the expense of
traditional fossil fuels.163 One commentator appropriately noted
that what is “done, however misguidedly, is done; a sunk cost is a
sunk cost. To favor windpower or biomass now would merely
compound a historic misjudgment by adding a questionable new
one.”164 Fears of gross market distortions are often overblown but
165
Still others more crudely extol the
certainly not without merit.
166
virtues of an unimpeded free market.
Essentially, the choices
boil down to individual policy judgments, but it would be easy to
rationalize the case for offering a putative advantage to
renewables, of retroactively leveraging past mistakes to serve the
promise of America’s future.167
162. See, e.g., CAROLYN FISCHER & RICHARD NEWELL, ENVIRONMENTAL AND
TECHNOLOGY POLICIES FOR CLIMATE CHANGE AND RENEWABLE ENERGY (2004)
(arguing that a direct price for carbon, rather than subsidies or an RPS,
provides the most efficient incentive for development of renewable technologies).
163. See JOEL DARMSTATDER, RESOURCE FOR THE FUTURE, THE ECONOMIC AND
POLICY SETTING OF RENEWABLE ENERGY 7 (2003).
164. Id. at 8.
165. For instance, the government of Spain enacted a feed-in tariff program
that paid developers 44 euro cents per kWh of electricity generated by solar
sources. After developers exploited loopholes and abused the system, the
government scaled back their payments. Once the deadline passed, the global
solar industry collapsed precipitously, with prices falling 30-40%. See Good
policy, and bad, supra note 119; Angel Gonzalez & Keith Johnson, Spain’s SolarPower Collapse Dims Subsidy Model, WALL STREET J., Sept. 8, 2009, at A4.
166. This approach is usually dictated by political motivations, as many of the
same individuals and organizations that denounce the inequitable result of a
PTC are ardent proponents of continued subsidization for conventional
beneficiaries like fossil fuels and agriculture. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Building
a Green Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2010, at MM34.
167. See GRUENSPECHT, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, THE ROLE OF TAX
INCENTIVES IN ENERGY POLICY 4 (2001) (“The presence of important externalities
[e.g. greenhouse gas and conventional pollutant emissions] creates an exception
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Restructuring

As far as the PTC itself, it should be extended to residential
and commercial sectors for on-site distributive generation to
harness the maximum benefits available. Adopting a dual
approach—by simultaneously restricting inclusion of nonrenewables like natural gas (proponed by some congressional
Republicans) while broadening its scope to include nonconventional and newly-invented renewables—would stimulate
cutting-edge technology propagation and continue to drive
innovation within the clean energy industry. Once the PTC is
broadened, additional federal policies can supplement its efficacy,
thereby effectively enhancing its economic value to the developer.
A federal RPS has already been suggested, and would do wonders
to stimulate spirited investment, as the market will be
guaranteed for the subsidized product (i.e. clean energy).
Furthermore, the federal Tax Code might be amended to allow for
immediate capital equipment deductions (i.e. depreciation
deductions) for renewable capacity; by allowing this “loss” to be
deducted initially rather than capitalized and deducted
incrementally over time, the return gain on the investment will
be realized at a far quicker pace.168 Capital investors are much
more likely to take the risk when the potential payoff may be
realized in only a few years.
Unfortunately, there is currently no existing statutory
legislation that would allow the IRS or EPA to simply promulgate
regulations and thereby administratively extend the PTC
pursuant to Congressional directive. With that in mind, and with
the understanding that the new Congressional session has
become markedly more liberal in addition to much more sensitive
to issues of energy independence, climate change, and renewable
energy investment, the easiest way to ensure the future of the
PTC at this point would be through new federal legislation that

to the usual presumption favoring neutral tax treatment of competing
technologies”). Presumably, the more competing fossil fuel technologies are
forced to realize externalities, the less need there is for the PTC. The two
strategies are complementary, and one will naturally precipitate the
obsolescence of the other.
168. C.f. I.R.C. §§ 167, 263 (2006); 26 U.S.C. § 26 (2006) (difference between
depreciation deductions and capital expenditure deductions).
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would codify its extension over no less than a 10 year period.
This piece of super-legislation would send a message of hope and
dedication to environmentalists around the world, and would
signal a truly inspired change in American foreign and domestic
policy, from issues of public infrastructure to national security to
true energy independence. Under the auspices of President
Obama, this statute will contain provisions for a federal
Renewable Portfolio Standard mandating a renewable energy
quota, a thirty-year extension of the Renewable Energy
Production Tax Credit (with broad definitions to allow for new
technologies to penetrate the markets), a cap and trade system,
and a final repeal of wasteful, interest-laden fossil fuel subsidies.
While certainly a stretch, the future of such legislation is now
bright. For the PTC, and the renewable industry at large, it
could not come soon enough.
E.

Historical Precedent for Government Infrastructure
Investment

“Never allow a crisis to go to waste . . . [t]hey are
opportunities to do big things,” said White House Chief of Staff
Rahm Emanuel.169 Numerous times throughout its history, the
federal government has laid the foundation for a strong, wellintegrated national infrastructure. Interestingly, these massive
public works projects coincided with periods of disruptive
economic turmoil. Yet through strong-willed leadership, the
federal government forged a path to a better future. The
government has invested heavily and often in every layer of the
country’s structural fabric, from transportation to energy to
telecommunications.170 Now, whilst in the throes of a deep
international recession, the country is forced to account for years
of infrastructure neglect as it is faced with the necessity of
investing heavily in smart grid and renewable energy

169. Jeff Zeleny, Obama Weighs Quick Undoing of Bush Policy, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 9, 2008 at A19.
170. See, e.g., Rural Electrification Act of 1936, 7 U.S.C. 31 (2000); The Pacific
Railway Acts of 1862, 12 Stat. 489 (2000); The Reconstruction Finance
Corporation Act, 47 Stat. 5 (1932).
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technologies.171 The ultimate fate of the Production Tax Credit
strikes at the heart of a far greater question—will the
government once more have the courage and foresight to invest in
America’s energy future? The recent British Petroleum oil spill
in the Gulf of Mexico further underscores the pressing need—and
the unique opportunity—to revamp our energy infrastructure and
economic underpinnings through extensive reform and proactive
172
progressive policies.
The potential benefits include job
173
growth, increased domestic production of renewable capital,174
cost decreases,175 and increased investment in America’s
infrastructure and energy future. This is exactly the sort of
stimulation that this recessed economy needs.176

171. See American Society of Civil Engineers, 2009 Report Card for America’s
Infrastructure, http://www.asce.org/reportcard/2009/ (last visited Aug. 20, 2010).
172. See N.Y. Times, Times Topics, Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill (2010),
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/o/oil_spills/
gulf_of_mexico_2010/index.html?scp=1-spot&sq=oil%20spill&st=cse (last visited
Aug. 20, 2010).
173. Mesa Power Places World’s Largest Single-Site Turbine Purchase Order,
ENERGY & ECOLOGY, May 26, 2008 (noting that large wind development projects
will raise the personal income throughout the investment areas by increasing
lease payments to landowners, providing jobs for local workers, etc.).
174. Ben Geman, Wind Power: Industry Reports Sharp Growth, Renews Plea
for Tax Certainty, GREENWIRE, Jan. 23, 2007 (U.S. is home to just “one of the top
10 turbine makers, which is GE”). See also Thomas Friedman, Flush with
Energy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2008 (noting that 35 wind turbine producers have
emerged from China in the last 18 months, and none from the U.S.). See also

Clean Energy: From the Margins to the Mainstream: Hearings of the S. Finance
Comm., 109th Cong. (2007) (statement of Ryan Wiser, Scientist, Lawrence
Berkeley National Laboratory) (finding that “with a 10 year PTC extension, you
might be able to increase the domestic manufacturing share significantly to
roughly 70 percent, bringing with it jobs and local economy development
benefits”).
175. See RYAN WISER, MARK BOLINGER & GALEN BARBOSE, USING THE FEDERAL
PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT TO BUILD A DURABLE MARKET FOR WIND POWER IN THE
UNITED STATES 6 (2007) (“savings were estimated to come, in part, from
delinking U.S. wind turbine prices from the Euro-Dollar exchange rate and
reducing transportation costs as local manufacturing becomes more prevalent”);
176. See New Energy Finance’s Zindler Discusses Prospects for Clean Energy
Investment, E&E NEWS PM, Oct. 21, 2008.
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CONCLUSION
The Production Tax Credit has had more than enough time to
prove its merit, and the results have been unequivocally positive.
Since its inception in 1992 through its various legislative
iterations, it has served to stimulate robust financial investment
in a desperate sector of the American infrastructure. In
weathering relentless partisan political attacks, the Credit has
emerged as a vital piece of the energy puzzle moving forward, a
trait that legislators on both sides of the aisle have come to
recognize (if not internalize).
Some might argue that enacting any of the above
recommendations would constitute an unjustifiable federal
interference with private enterprise, with no clear return on that
investment for the benefit of the taxpayers. Such a view is
inherently misguided.
Issues of consumer reliability and
environmental destruction are frequently subsumed within the
larger concerns of national security. Liberating the country from
the traditional restraints associated with volatile fuel prices and
vulnerability to aggressive supplier nations should be enough of a
reason to motivate a permanent and emphatic shift towards
cleaner, more reliable sources of energy.
But to continue nurturing the economic development of the
fragile renewable energy industry, it is imperative to extend the
PTCs for a lengthy period of ten years or more. The transition to
a federal RPS will only facilitate this investment and
development, but should be used to strengthen the effect of the
PTCs. Extending these credits to a variety of different sources,
from wind to geothermal, was a step in the right direction and
should be built upon moving ahead.
As a template for the future, Congress should expand the
scope of the PTC to cover cutting-edge energy generation
technology, and should include the residential and commercial
sectors for on-site distributed generation.
The longer the
government can guarantee economic stability in this form, the
faster economies of scale will be achieved uniformly across the
regions that are best able to exploit renewable resources. The
best hope for America’s energy future is a combination of
incentive measures, with the Production Tax Credit headlining
the charge. Let us hope that our leaders can muster the political
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will necessary to break our crippling addiction, to achieve true
energy independence in the face of a world strained by our very
existence.
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